Berschinski, R. AFRICOM’s dilemma: The global war on terrorism, capacity building, humanitarianism and the future of US security policy in Africa, US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 2007
Because of its pioneering incorporation of security, development, and humanitarian functions into one organization, AFRICOM may be particularly susceptible to criticism if its sporadic “hard” operations overshadow its “softer” initiatives. This concern is not merely academic: If AFRICOM is seen as camouflaging militarism in the guise of humanitarianism, even non-DoD American efforts in Africa are likely to suffer a loss of legitimacy and effectiveness. It follows that, in order to be successful, AFRICOM must divorce itself from the model of U.S. military engagement in Africa since 9/11. As AFRICOM becomes fully operational by the end of 2008, its planners should recognize that saying the command is focused on African priorities will not be enough. Rather, AFRICOM must demonstrate its commitment to a long-term security relationship on African terms.(p.1)
Its supporters indicate that African reticence can be overcome through improved “strategic communication,” public diplomacy, and a commitment to security cooperation. While important, no amount of “messaging” will triumph over the power of American actions on the Continent. (p.3)
Notwithstanding localized successes and short-term gains, the problem with an AFRICOM based on the OEF-TS and CJTF-HOA models is that African security is simply not tied to GWOT-framed policies. Scholars familiar with the African security landscape continually argue that African leaders do not regard transnational Islamist terrorism with anything approaching the urgency of the United States. This position is not one of ignorance; rather, it reflects the reality of Africa’s true security priorities: hunger, disease, internecine warfare, oppressive regimes, and crushing poverty. (p.10)
In place of the GWOT’s existing policy of “aggregation,” Kilcullen advocates a fundamentally antithetical one that he reasonably entitles “disaggregation.” The core elements of the strategy of disaggregation “break the links that allow the jihad to function as a global entity.”52...the grievances implicit in populations supporting local insurgencies are ameliorated through a radical new calculus of effort: 80 percent political, diplomatic, developmental, and informational; and 20 percent military.53 (p.15)
As evidenced by the lack of transnational terrorism in most of sub-Saharan Africa, poverty does not inevitably cause terrorism.73 But it does provide a fertile breeding ground for exploitation by groups like al-Qaeda hoping to harness local grievances to pan-Islamic jihad. This pattern holds true for educational opportunity: Individual terrorists may have above-average educational backgrounds, but they often act in the name of, and are supported by, the larger, educationally disadvantaged society around them.74 (p. 21)
DC: Berschinski posits the very interesting question, "Given Africa’s poverty woes, why hasn’t the continent produced more transnational terrorism?" In addition to the highly likely rhetorical response, "Africans are simply too poor and underdeveloped to facilitate effective terrorist networks," Berschinski further notes, "The lack of transportation and communication capability in Africa’s vast rural areas is not conducive to the logistical and operational necessities of modern terrorism." One might plausibly ask then, why would it be in the US' interest to develop such networks?
DC: As contributed to the Arab Spring revolts and the Occupy movements in the US and across Western Europe in 2011, Berschinski suggests a second explanation that it is "not poverty alone that promotes affiliation with terrorist groups, but rather economic inequality.84 Under this rubric, economic development itself—if inequitable—can cause the social unrest on which terrorism feeds."
The irony is that U.S. efforts to train Sahelian militaries through OEF-TS are often cited as examples of catalyzing “African solutions to African problems.” As long as the GWOT remains at the heart of U.S. capacity-building in Africa, however, “African problems” will be selected within predetermined U.S. boundaries. (p.31)
No matter the reason, inconsistencies in U.S. security policy in Africa are not lost on African leaders and influential opinion-makers. In no small part due to the war in Iraq, African leaders are increasingly fearful of the United States abandoning balanced civil-military initiatives to shorter-term, strictly military solutions. AFRICOM officials have done an impressive job of allaying such fears through public pronouncements and consultations with African leaders. Only through its future actions, however, will AFRICOM demonstrate responsiveness to African perceptions of African security threats.(p. 50)
The growing depth and reach of the African Union (AU) and various African Regional Economic Communities (RECs) demonstrates a renewed commitment to breaking free of the continent’s history of violence and poverty.185 The nascent African Standby Force, with its five REC-affiliated brigades, offers a promising milestone toward achieving “African solutions to African problems” in the security realm. The United States, through AFRICOM, can play a productive role in bringing about this vision of a more peaceful, plentiful Africa. The attention and resources garnered by a flag officer and full-time staff will benefit a continent heretofore prioritized by no one. AFRICOM’s goals of building partnership capacity at the state, REC, and AU levels can bring much-needed support to African peacekeeping and peace-enforcement operations. AFRICOM, in close coordination with the State Department, should work to expand the African Contingency Operations Training and Assistance (ACOTA) program, which provides “train-the-trainer” peacekeeping support to the AU. Such an expansion would ideally include increased attendance by African military units, but should also incorporate the training of civilians in aspects of contingency operations related to health, natural disaster response, and humanitarian aid.
Additionally, through various Theater Security Cooperation and Security Assistance initiatives, AFRICOM has the opportunity to reorient many African militaries away from internal regime security and toward external defense. This process should build on preexisting efforts to inculcate military professionalism and Western notions of civil-military relations in partnering African states. Bringing senior African military leaders to American staff and war colleges for professional military education pays large dividends in this regard on relatively low-cost investments. Enlarging the scope of opportunity for uniformed and civilian African leaders to attend International Military Education and Training (IMET) programs and the Africa Center for Strategic Studies (ACSS) should rate highly on AFRICOM’s priority list.
Elements of the global jihadi insurgency are present in several African regions, and AFRICOM should consider the mitigation of these elements one of its primary goals. Yet this will best be accomplished through partnering with African nations—on African terms—in matters of intelligence sharing, law enforcement, military cooperation, and through countering the conditions that breed disaffection.(pp.51-52)
AFRICOM draft mission statement presented February 9, 2007 reads:
US Africa Command promotes US National Security objectives by working with African states and regional organizations to help strengthen stability and security in the AOR. US Africa Command leads the in-theater DoD response to support other USG agencies in implementing USG security policies and strategies. In concert with other US government and international partners, US Africa Command conducts theater security cooperation activities to assist in building security capacity and improve accountable governance. As directed, US Africa Command conducts military operations to deter aggression and respond to crises. Foreign Press Center Briefing with Theresa Whelan, U.S. Department of State Washington Foreign Press Center
U.S. Army Africa: A Team Like No Other - (Sep 2009) Maj. Gen. William B. Garrett III U.S. Army Africa’s mission on the continent is unique: to promote sustained security among African land forces and serve as contingency headquarters supporting crisis response.
U.S. Army Africa’s new role: Small groups of soldiers with unique skill sets partner with African militaries to share knowledge and information, allowing Africans to choose which ideas apply to their situations and empowering them to resolve problems their own way.
Our bottom line is that U.S. Army Africa efforts must support the policies and plans established by the U.S. embassy in each nation, many of which have U.S. Army officers serving as defense attachés. There are no plans for a large U.S. Army footprint in Africa; the deployment of a battalion or a brigade would happen only in the case of a crisis. Instead, the command deploys small teams of mentors. These teams work traditional “train-the-trainer” missions, building the capacity of partner nations’ instructors and enabling them to turn around and teach their own people.
Army National Guard, and LTG Jack C. Stultz Jr., chief of the U.S. Army Reserve and commanding general of the U.S. Army Reserve Command, met with key U.S. Army Africa leaders to discuss how citizen-soldiers’ important capabilities—from those of civil affairs personnel and engineers to medics and military police—can be put to good use in Africa. U.S. Army Africa also uses established efforts, such as the National Guard’s state partnership program (SPP), to further U.S. Army interaction with African nations. For more than 15 years, U.S. soldiers have worked with foreign militaries during SPP events. In all, there are seven state partnerships
with African nations: California with Nigeria, New York with South Africa, North Carolina with Botswana, Utah with Morocco, Vermont with Senegal, Wyoming with
Tunisia and North Dakota with Ghana. Often, U.S. National Guard units fulfill similar roles to the militaries of partner countries in Africa, training to both deploy
in support of national missions and respond to local emergencies.
[Exercise "Natural Fire" in October 2009 brought] together U.S. soldiers with African troops from five partner nations in Uganda, an interoperability challenge that will allow U.S. Army Africa to deepen our understanding of their abilities and map future mentoring missions to build African military capacity.
Crisis Prevention: USAFRICOM, Partnerships, and the US Army - (Autumn 2009) Colonel Stephen J. Mariano and Major George L. Deuel
Colonel Mariano is the U.S. Army Africa Assistant Chief of Staff, G5, Strategic Plans, Policies and Assessments. Major Deuel is a Strategic Plans and Policy Officer at the U.S. Army Southern European Task Force/U.S. Army Africa in Vicenza, Italy.
To ease future peacekeeping operations and increase cooperation, [President's Clinton's] administration launched the African Crisis Response Force (ACRF), soon renamed the African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI) when the word force attracted criticism.
President George W. Bush replaced ACRI with the Africa Contingency Operations Training and Assistance Program, and increased attention to terrorism following the attacks of 11 September 2001. His administration initiated joint military-training programs in Africa, including Operation Flintlock and Operation Enduring Freedom Trans-Sahara.
With two thousand soldiers and contractors, CJTF-HOA in Djibouti is the largest U.S. military base on the continent. It is likely a model for an eventual AFRICOM headquarters on the continent because African military officers from throughout the region are embedded in its staff, and it broadly engages with African regional
institutions in its pursuit of the so-called “3 D’s” of American foreign policy: defense, diplomacy, and development (Pham 2008; van de Walle 2010).
AFRICOM is taking over the coordination of CJTF-HOA, trans-Saharan counterterrorism operations, joint military training exercises, and much conflict-prevention and peacekeeper-training work, yet several of its features make clear that it is more than just a bureaucratic reorganization. Additional “phase zero” operations anticipate enhancing security capacity to prevent conflicts from emerging in the first place and shaping attitudes toward America in advance, in case combat takes place in the future (McFate 2008b; Priest 2004). An American aid worker in the Congo gave this author the example of DOD dropping leaflets over the city of Goma in 2009. A
retired senior State Department official singled out the website magharebia. com as one of AFRICOM’s propaganda operations working at odds with diplomatic initiatives in northern Africa.
Berouk, Mesfin. (APR 2009) The establishment and implications of the United States Africa Command : an African perspective. South African Institute for Strategic Studies
The establishment of AFRICOM could be taken as a credible symbol of US commitment, notionally indicating the newly emerging strategic importance attached to Africa by the US. It could also signal an attempt by the US to better understand historical legacies, multiple circumstances, wider security concerns and geopolitical parameters of African states. Beyond that, AFRICOM was not designed to address ongoing confl icts and even prevent nascent crises from intensifying in Africa. But it could provide the context and guidance for solving Africa’s political and military crises early enough for them to be meaningful, or at least for damping down unwelcome developments and reversing external disruptions in Africa.
It could help in particular with training deployable African peacekeeping battalions and building relatively more professional African militaries that are able to fend off external threats, foil planned terrorist attacks, and protect sensitive areas such as oil installations. It could also provide a channel of communications, and even seek reciprocal restraints and develop mutual trust between warring sides. Finally, it could enhance maritime security along Africa’s coastlines in order to reduce criminality through the provision of effective training, intelligence and technical support, as well as conducting occasional joint exercises.
It could also lead to a blind endorsement by the US, as occurred during the Cold War,of institutionally ineffective, economically corrupt and politically repressive regimes which are led by astute and ruthless leaders. These regimes would enthusiastically cooperate with AFRICOM, a deceitful alibi for them to commit heinous human rights abuses using Cold War tactics with some modifications.Despite its rhetoric about spreading democracy,the US could thereby be held responsible for the erosion of gains towards multiparty democracy and the derailment of internal motors for political change in Africa. The greater the association of
the US with an African state, the greater its identification with the prevailing regime, which would be emboldened either to resist settlements in unresolved internal and
external conflicts or simply to avoid making necessary reforms or to reach out to opposition parties excluded from power.An overt US presence or connection could thus transform the stakes of African conflicts and make them more impervious to diplomatic solutions.It could exacerbate regional tensions, as rival states compete to host AFRICOM facilities, rather than contribute to compromise solutions.
First, stationing troops in Africa will be regionally disruptive,and will politically undermine the host state, exposing it to intensified criticism that it is just a puppet, while depicting the US as being unnecessarily aggressive. Second, the creation of such capabilities would create incentives for their use by the US military for other
purposes, including counter-productive interventions. Thus, the Obama administration should focus more on how to incrementally shore up US interests and infl uence
in Africa, based on the political performance of African states, including their observance of internationally accepted principles of democracy, without further destabilising them and jeopardising their long-term cooperation.
Author's Note 96: For millions of ordinary Africans hoping for the best, but expecting much worse, the most important question is whether AFRICOM was really the outcome of an objective analysis of Africa’s proper and long-term security requirements?
Another question is how AFRICOM will responsibly deal with Africa’s diverse and unforeseeable conflicts among multiple groups quickly mobilising thousands of supporters? These conflicts usually explode as a result of colonially crafted internal ethno-religious tensions, extreme deprivation and growing inequality spawning rebel movements as well as ill-advised external intervention, and give external powers little warning or reaction time. They sometimes involve Western-trained predatory militaries, strain fragile economies, lead to the complete breakdown of political order and threaten regional security by spreading to neighbouring states, drawing them into the conflict and generating refugee and IDP flows as well as an illegal arms trade.
Finally, Africans wonder whether AFRICOM will look at Africa in a long-term framework, as much as a decade ahead. In fact, even the most zealously pro-US African regimes are sceptical about the US long-term commitment to the degree that they forge close ties with China and potentially act against US interests. They are usually eager to get as much out of US engagement as possible, trading short-term benefits for themselves at the clear risk of their states’ long-term security and the related risk of undermining the African Union’s attempt to assume responsibility over security on the continent.
Nice list of US engagements with Africa since 1820 battle with Berbery Pirates.
Pendleton, J. H. (2009). Defense Management: Actions Needed to Address Stakeholder Concerns, Improve Interagency Collaboration and Determine Costs Assoc. with the U. S. Africa Command. DIANE Publishing.
Stewart Patrick, & Kaysie Brown. (2007). The Pentagon and Global Development: Making Sense of the DoD’s Expanding Role (Working Papers). Center for Global Development.
"Conducting operations in the realm of peace and security: key issues and challenges in the African context" (2003) Neethling, T. Journal: Small Wars & Insurgencies Vol/Issue: 14 (2), Page: 87ELECTRONIC COPY HAMMERMILL LIB
AFRICOM &tc.
AFRICOM Documents and Fact SheetsPartnership, Engagement Highlight U.S. Africa Policy
Statements on the importance of Africa to US Security by Amanda J. Dory, U.S. deputy assistant secretary of defense for African affairs on 10/11/12
http://www.defpro.com/news/details/40236/?SID=b9187f583dc6a6e3e83220eea4b15859
Berschinski, R. AFRICOM’s dilemma: The global war on terrorism, capacity building, humanitarianism and the future of US security policy in Africa, US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 2007
Because of its pioneering incorporation of security, development, and humanitarian functions into one organization, AFRICOM may be particularly susceptible to criticism if its sporadic “hard” operations overshadow its “softer” initiatives. This concern is not merely academic: If AFRICOM is seen as camouflaging militarism in the guise of humanitarianism, even non-DoD American efforts in Africa are likely to suffer a loss of legitimacy and effectiveness. It follows that, in order to be successful, AFRICOM must divorce itself from the model of U.S. military engagement in Africa since 9/11. As AFRICOM becomes fully operational by the end of 2008, its planners should recognize that saying the command is focused on African priorities will not be enough. Rather, AFRICOM must demonstrate its commitment to a long-term security relationship on African terms.(p.1)
Its supporters indicate that African reticence can be overcome through improved “strategic communication,” public diplomacy, and a commitment to security cooperation. While important, no amount of “messaging” will triumph over the power of American actions on the Continent. (p.3)
Notwithstanding localized successes and short-term gains, the problem with an AFRICOM based on the OEF-TS and CJTF-HOA models is that African security is simply not tied to GWOT-framed policies. Scholars familiar with the African security landscape continually argue that African leaders do not regard transnational Islamist terrorism with anything approaching the urgency of the United States. This position is not one of ignorance; rather, it reflects the reality of Africa’s true security priorities: hunger, disease, internecine warfare, oppressive regimes, and crushing poverty. (p.10)
In place of the GWOT’s existing policy of “aggregation,” Kilcullen advocates a fundamentally antithetical one that he reasonably entitles “disaggregation.” The core elements of the strategy of disaggregation “break the links that allow the jihad to function as a global entity.”52...the grievances implicit in populations supporting local insurgencies are ameliorated through a radical new calculus of effort: 80 percent political, diplomatic, developmental, and informational; and 20 percent military.53 (p.15)
As evidenced by the lack of transnational terrorism in most of sub-Saharan Africa, poverty does not inevitably cause terrorism.73 But it does provide a fertile breeding ground for exploitation by groups like al-Qaeda hoping to harness local grievances to pan-Islamic jihad. This pattern holds true for educational opportunity: Individual terrorists may have above-average educational backgrounds, but they often act in the name of, and are supported by, the larger, educationally disadvantaged society around them.74 (p. 21)
DC: Berschinski posits the very interesting question, "Given Africa’s poverty woes, why hasn’t the continent produced more transnational terrorism?" In addition to the highly likely rhetorical response, "Africans are simply too poor and underdeveloped to facilitate effective terrorist networks," Berschinski further notes, "The lack of transportation and communication capability in Africa’s vast rural areas is not conducive to the logistical and operational necessities of modern terrorism." One might plausibly ask then, why would it be in the US' interest to develop such networks?
DC: As contributed to the Arab Spring revolts and the Occupy movements in the US and across Western Europe in 2011, Berschinski suggests a second explanation that it is "not poverty alone that promotes affiliation with terrorist groups, but rather economic inequality.84 Under this rubric, economic development itself—if inequitable—can cause the social unrest on which terrorism feeds."
The irony is that U.S. efforts to train Sahelian militaries through OEF-TS are often cited as examples of catalyzing “African solutions to African problems.” As long as the GWOT remains at the heart of U.S. capacity-building in Africa, however, “African problems” will be selected within predetermined U.S. boundaries. (p.31)
No matter the reason, inconsistencies in U.S. security policy in Africa are not lost on African leaders and influential opinion-makers. In no small part due to the war in Iraq, African leaders are increasingly fearful of the United States abandoning balanced civil-military initiatives to shorter-term, strictly military solutions. AFRICOM officials have done an impressive job of allaying such fears through public pronouncements and consultations with African leaders. Only through its future actions, however, will AFRICOM demonstrate responsiveness to African perceptions of African security threats.(p. 50)
The growing depth and reach of the African Union (AU) and various African Regional Economic Communities (RECs) demonstrates a renewed commitment to breaking free of the continent’s history of violence and poverty.185 The nascent African Standby Force, with its five REC-affiliated brigades, offers a promising milestone toward achieving “African solutions to African problems” in the security realm. The United States, through AFRICOM, can play a productive role in bringing about this vision of a more peaceful, plentiful Africa. The attention and resources garnered by a flag officer and full-time staff will benefit a continent heretofore prioritized by no one. AFRICOM’s goals of building partnership capacity at the state, REC, and AU levels can bring much-needed support to African peacekeeping and peace-enforcement operations. AFRICOM, in close coordination with the State Department, should work to expand the African Contingency Operations Training and Assistance (ACOTA) program, which provides “train-the-trainer” peacekeeping support to the AU. Such an expansion would ideally include increased attendance by African military units, but should also incorporate the training of civilians in aspects of contingency operations related to health, natural disaster response, and humanitarian aid.
Additionally, through various Theater Security Cooperation and Security Assistance initiatives, AFRICOM has the opportunity to reorient many African militaries away from internal regime security and toward external defense. This process should build on preexisting efforts to inculcate military professionalism and Western notions of civil-military relations in partnering African states. Bringing senior African military leaders to American staff and war colleges for professional military education pays large dividends in this regard on relatively low-cost investments. Enlarging the scope of opportunity for uniformed and civilian African leaders to attend International Military Education and Training (IMET) programs and the Africa Center for Strategic Studies (ACSS) should rate highly on AFRICOM’s priority list.
Elements of the global jihadi insurgency are present in several African regions, and AFRICOM should consider the mitigation of these elements one of its primary goals. Yet this will best be accomplished through partnering with African nations—on African terms—in matters of intelligence sharing, law enforcement, military cooperation, and through countering the conditions that breed disaffection.(pp.51-52)
AFRICOM draft mission statement presented February 9, 2007 reads:
US Africa Command promotes US National Security objectives by working with African states and regional organizations to help strengthen stability and security in the AOR. US Africa Command leads the in-theater DoD response to support other USG agencies in implementing USG security policies and strategies. In concert with other US government and international partners, US Africa Command conducts theater security cooperation activities to assist in building security capacity and improve accountable governance. As directed, US Africa Command conducts military operations to deter aggression and respond to crises.
Foreign Press Center Briefing with Theresa Whelan, U.S. Department of State Washington Foreign Press Center
US Army Africa
U.S. Army Africa: A Team Like No Other - (Sep 2009) Maj. Gen. William B. Garrett III
U.S. Army Africa’s mission on the continent is unique: to promote sustained security among African land forces and serve as contingency headquarters supporting crisis response.
U.S. Army Africa’s new role: Small groups of soldiers with unique skill sets partner with African militaries to share knowledge and information, allowing Africans to choose which ideas apply to their situations and empowering them to resolve problems their own way.
Our bottom line is that U.S. Army Africa efforts must support the policies and plans established by the U.S. embassy in each nation, many of which have U.S. Army officers serving as defense attachés. There are no plans for a large U.S. Army footprint in Africa; the deployment of a battalion or a brigade would happen only in the case of a crisis. Instead, the command deploys small teams of mentors. These teams work traditional “train-the-trainer” missions, building the capacity of partner nations’ instructors and enabling them to turn around and teach their own people.
Army National Guard, and LTG Jack C. Stultz Jr., chief of the U.S. Army Reserve and commanding general of the U.S. Army Reserve Command, met with key U.S. Army Africa leaders to discuss how citizen-soldiers’ important capabilities—from those of civil affairs personnel and engineers to medics and military police—can be put to good use in Africa. U.S. Army Africa also uses established efforts, such as the National Guard’s state partnership program (SPP), to further U.S. Army interaction with African nations. For more than 15 years, U.S. soldiers have worked with foreign militaries during SPP events. In all, there are seven state partnerships
with African nations: California with Nigeria, New York with South Africa, North Carolina with Botswana, Utah with Morocco, Vermont with Senegal, Wyoming with
Tunisia and North Dakota with Ghana. Often, U.S. National Guard units fulfill similar roles to the militaries of partner countries in Africa, training to both deploy
in support of national missions and respond to local emergencies.
[Exercise "Natural Fire" in October 2009 brought] together U.S. soldiers with African troops from five partner nations in Uganda, an interoperability challenge that will allow U.S. Army Africa to deepen our understanding of their abilities and map future mentoring missions to build African military capacity.
Crisis Prevention: USAFRICOM, Partnerships, and the US Army - (Autumn 2009) Colonel Stephen J. Mariano and Major George L. Deuel
Colonel Mariano is the U.S. Army Africa Assistant Chief of Staff, G5, Strategic Plans, Policies and Assessments. Major Deuel is a Strategic Plans and Policy Officer at the U.S. Army Southern European Task Force/U.S. Army Africa in Vicenza, Italy.
SSI Study Dec 2011 Real Leadership and the US Army:
http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=1095&utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+StrategicStudiesInstitute+%28Strategic+Studies+Institute+U.S.+Army+War+College%29&utm_content=Google+Feedfetcher
A. Carl LeVan. (2010). The Political Economy of African Responses to the U.S. Africa Command. Africa Today, 57(1), 3-23.
To ease future peacekeeping operations and increase cooperation, [President's Clinton's] administration launched the African Crisis Response Force (ACRF), soon renamed the African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI) when the word force attracted criticism.
President George W. Bush replaced ACRI with the Africa Contingency Operations Training and Assistance Program, and increased attention to terrorism following the attacks of 11 September 2001. His administration initiated joint military-training programs in Africa, including Operation Flintlock and Operation Enduring Freedom Trans-Sahara.
With two thousand soldiers and contractors, CJTF-HOA in Djibouti is the largest U.S. military base on the continent. It is likely a model for an eventual AFRICOM headquarters on the continent because African military officers from throughout the region are embedded in its staff, and it broadly engages with African regional
institutions in its pursuit of the so-called “3 D’s” of American foreign policy: defense, diplomacy, and development (Pham 2008; van de Walle 2010).
AFRICOM is taking over the coordination of CJTF-HOA, trans-Saharan counterterrorism operations, joint military training exercises, and much conflict-prevention and peacekeeper-training work, yet several of its features make clear that it is more than just a bureaucratic reorganization. Additional “phase zero” operations anticipate enhancing security capacity to prevent conflicts from emerging in the first place and shaping attitudes toward America in advance, in case combat takes place in the future (McFate 2008b; Priest 2004). An American aid worker in the Congo gave this author the example of DOD dropping leaflets over the city of Goma in 2009. A
retired senior State Department official singled out the website magharebia. com as one of AFRICOM’s propaganda operations working at odds with diplomatic initiatives in northern Africa.
Berouk, Mesfin. (APR 2009) The establishment and implications of the United States Africa Command : an African perspective. South African Institute for Strategic Studies
The establishment of AFRICOM could be taken as a credible symbol of US commitment, notionally indicating the newly emerging strategic importance attached to Africa by the US. It could also signal an attempt by the US to better understand historical legacies, multiple circumstances, wider security concerns and geopolitical parameters of African states. Beyond that, AFRICOM was not designed to address ongoing confl icts and even prevent nascent crises from intensifying in Africa. But it could provide the context and guidance for solving Africa’s political and military crises early enough for them to be meaningful, or at least for damping down unwelcome developments and reversing external disruptions in Africa.
It could help in particular with training deployable African peacekeeping battalions and building relatively more professional African militaries that are able to fend off external threats, foil planned terrorist attacks, and protect sensitive areas such as oil installations. It could also provide a channel of communications, and even seek reciprocal restraints and develop mutual trust between warring sides. Finally, it could enhance maritime security along Africa’s coastlines in order to reduce criminality through the provision of effective training, intelligence and technical support, as well as conducting occasional joint exercises.
It could also lead to a blind endorsement by the US, as occurred during the Cold War,of institutionally ineffective, economically corrupt and politically repressive regimes which are led by astute and ruthless leaders. These regimes would enthusiastically cooperate with AFRICOM, a deceitful alibi for them to commit heinous human rights abuses using Cold War tactics with some modifications.Despite its rhetoric about spreading democracy,the US could thereby be held responsible for the erosion of gains towards multiparty democracy and the derailment of internal motors for political change in Africa. The greater the association of
the US with an African state, the greater its identification with the prevailing regime, which would be emboldened either to resist settlements in unresolved internal and
external conflicts or simply to avoid making necessary reforms or to reach out to opposition parties excluded from power.An overt US presence or connection could thus transform the stakes of African conflicts and make them more impervious to diplomatic solutions.It could exacerbate regional tensions, as rival states compete to host AFRICOM facilities, rather than contribute to compromise solutions.
First, stationing troops in Africa will be regionally disruptive,and will politically undermine the host state, exposing it to intensified criticism that it is just a puppet, while depicting the US as being unnecessarily aggressive. Second, the creation of such capabilities would create incentives for their use by the US military for other
purposes, including counter-productive interventions. Thus, the Obama administration should focus more on how to incrementally shore up US interests and infl uence
in Africa, based on the political performance of African states, including their observance of internationally accepted principles of democracy, without further destabilising them and jeopardising their long-term cooperation.
Author's Note 96: For millions of ordinary Africans hoping for the best, but expecting much worse, the most important question is whether AFRICOM was really the outcome of an objective analysis of Africa’s proper and long-term security requirements?
Another question is how AFRICOM will responsibly deal with Africa’s diverse and unforeseeable conflicts among multiple groups quickly mobilising thousands of supporters? These conflicts usually explode as a result of colonially crafted internal ethno-religious tensions, extreme deprivation and growing inequality spawning rebel movements as well as ill-advised external intervention, and give external powers little warning or reaction time. They sometimes involve Western-trained predatory militaries, strain fragile economies, lead to the complete breakdown of political order and threaten regional security by spreading to neighbouring states, drawing them into the conflict and generating refugee and IDP flows as well as an illegal arms trade.
Finally, Africans wonder whether AFRICOM will look at Africa in a long-term framework, as much as a decade ahead. In fact, even the most zealously pro-US African regimes are sceptical about the US long-term commitment to the degree that they forge close ties with China and potentially act against US interests. They are usually eager to get as much out of US engagement as possible, trading short-term benefits for themselves at the clear risk of their states’ long-term security and the related risk of undermining the African Union’s attempt to assume responsibility over security on the continent.
Pham, J.Peter. (2009, Apr) "Been There, Already Doing That: America's Security Engagement with Africa." Contemporary Security Policy Vol 30, No 1
Nice list of US engagements with Africa since 1820 battle with Berbery Pirates.
Pendleton, J. H. (2009). Defense Management: Actions Needed to Address Stakeholder Concerns, Improve Interagency Collaboration and Determine Costs Assoc. with the U. S. Africa Command. DIANE Publishing.
David Passage (February 2009) “Speaking Out: AFRICOM and SOUTHCOM: Reliquaria from an Earlier Age.” Foreign Service Journal
Malan, M. (2008, July). US Civil-Military Imbalance for Global Engagement. Refugees International.
Pace, P. (2008). Joint Publication 3-0 Joint Operations. Retrieved from http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jointpub_operations.htm
Okumu, W. (2007). Africa Command: Opportunity for Enhanced Engagement or the Militarization of U.S.-Africa Relations?
Ruiters, M. (2007, February 14). Why U.S.’s Africom Will Hurt Africa. BusinessDay. Johannesburg. Retrieved from http://allafrica.com/stories/200702140349.html
Stewart Patrick, & Kaysie Brown. (2007). The Pentagon and Global Development: Making Sense of the DoD’s Expanding Role (Working Papers). Center for Global Development.
Pham,J. Peter. (Fall 2007) “Securing Africa” Journal of Int’l Security Affairs 13: 15-24: http://www.securityaffairs.org/issues/2007/13/pham.php
USJF Command. (2006). Joint Publication 5-0 Joint Operation Planning. Retrieved from www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp5_0.pdf
"Conducting operations in the realm of peace and security: key issues and challenges in the African context" (2003) Neethling, T. Journal: Small Wars & Insurgencies
Vol/Issue: 14 (2), Page: 87 ELECTRONIC COPY HAMMERMILL LIB
Information on AEI-hosted "AFRICOM and Beyond" conference, 2008:
http://www.aei.org/events/2008/10/01/africom-and-beyond-the-future-of-us-african-security-and-defense-relations-event-1/#